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Abstract
We study how network externalities affect research and development (Rinvestments by a
non−cooperative duopoly that offers compatible products. We find that multiple RDequilibria
may arise when network externalities are non linear in the number of consumers. The lowest
RDequilibrium corresponds to the case where network externalities are absent. However,
even in the presence of network externalities, firms may be trapped in a low−RDequilibrium
where output, and therefore consumers' valuation of the network size, is low. We derive the
conditions under which the highest−RD equilibrium Pareto dominates.
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Network externalities arise when a consumer’s utility depends on the number of users of a
good or a service (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Farrell and Saloner 1986). Although a characteris-
tic of many markets, network externalities are particularly important in technology-intensive
markets. Telephone, fax or e-mail exhibit direct positive network externalities because a
larger network increases communication possibilities. Furthermore, larger networks are also
appealing to suppliers of complementary goods and services. In such cases, consumers indi-
rectly beneﬁt from an expansion of the market (Berg 1988, Chou and Shy 1990, Church and
Gandal 1993). Technology-intensive markets, e.g. telecommunications, are also character-
ized by their high R&D intensity. Our objective is to investigate how network externalities
aﬀect ﬁrms’ R&D.
To our knowledge, Kristiansen and Thum (1997) are unique in the examination of the
impact of network externalities on R&D. They consider a duopoly where ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀer-
entiated, but compatible, products. The authors distinguish between commercial and mass
users, but where the willingness to pay depends on the number of mass users. They also
assume that one ﬁrm cannot improve its technology, while the other ﬁrm’s technology for
the mass market may be improved if it performs R&D. They ﬁnd that network externalities
may lead ﬁrms to either under- or over- invest in R&D compared to the social optimum.
In a related paper, Kristiansen (1998) shows that network externalities may induce ﬁrms to
introduce technologies earlier than in their absence.
We consider a duopoly with compatible products as in Kristiansen and Thum (1997).
However, we depart from their analysis on two main accounts. First, although most theoret-
ical analysis on network externalities assume that a consumer’s utility is a linear increasing
function of the number of users (Conner 1995, Kristiansen and Thum 1997), this may not be
consistent with empirical evidence. In fact, consumer utility may be independent of the mar-
ket size if there are few users because of indirect externalities. Providers of complementary
goods and services enter a market only if potential sales are suﬃciently high to cover costs.
Moreover, as acknowledged by Katz and Shapiro (1985), after some point, additional users
may have a negligible impact on a consumer’s utility, as for instance in the stereo market
(Postrel 1990, p.176). Between these two thresholds, consumer utility may increase more or
less rapidly with the number of users. A more realistic representation of network externali-
ties is similar to the diﬀusion process: a slow start followed by an acceleration portion, and
then deceleration and possibly a decrease.
This note focusses on compatible technologies because there appears to be a consensus
that incompatible technologies are less likely to coexist in the presence of network exter-
nalities (Farrell and Saloner 1986, Besen and Farrell 1994). Indeed, it is diﬃcult for a new
incompatible technology to get a foothold in a market where another technology already
has a substantial installed base because few consumers will adopt the new incompatible
technology. There are also regulatory standards mandated by governments to meet health,
safety, or environmental objectives. In high-technology sectors, however, most standards are
1voluntary. For instance, Kodak convinced the major players in the photographic industry
to jointly develop the speciﬁcations of the Advanced Photo System. For these reasons, we
assume that ﬁrms use the same technology, but contrary to Kristiansen and Thum (1997)
that each can invest in R&D to reduce its unit cost of production.
We show that multiple R&D equilibria may arise when a product exhibits network ex-
ternalities. As ﬁrms behave a la Cournot on the goods and services market, and invest in
cost-reducing R&D, more R&D is associated with a lower price. In this case, consumers’
welfare is highest when ﬁrms are located on the highest R&D equilibrium. Interestingly, the
lowest R&D equilibrium occurs when no network externalities arise. At this equilibrium,
the unit cost of production is high and few consumers are attracted on the market as the
network size is too small. Thus, although a product may exhibit network externalities, ﬁrms’
myopic behavior may preclude them from appearing at all. However, R&D investment is
never smaller with network externalities than when they are absent. This result arises be-
cause each unit of R&D has an extra eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s proﬁts through the fall in the cost of
production which attracts new consumers and as a result increases the willingness to pay of
all consumers. Finally, we derive a suﬃcient condition for a ﬁrm’s equilibrium proﬁts to be
increasing in R&D, in which case the equilibrium with the highest R&D Pareto dominates.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. We use the stylized facts of markets
with network externalities to set up the model economy in section 2. Next, we solve for each
ﬁrm’s equilibrium R&D investment in section 3 and establish the conditions under which
multiple equilibria may arise. Finally we discuss our results in section 4.
2 The Model Economy
Consider an economy populated by a large number of consumers and two ﬁrms which produce
a homogeneous good which potentially exhibits network externalities. The timing of events
is as follows. First, as in Katz and Shapiro (1985), consumers maximize their surplus and
form expectations about the network size Qe. Consumers’ expectations determine their
willingness to pay for the market size, v(Qe), where v :  + −→   + which may be a non
monotonous function. For instance, the beneﬁts from network size may equal zero when
there are few users, increase after a threshold and then decrease after a ceiling because of
congestion eﬀects. Second, ﬁrms choose their R&D expenditure. Third, ﬁrms behave a la
Cournot and decide how much to produce. Finally all markets clear.
As in Katz and Shapiro (1985), we augment the standard linear inverse demand function
to account for network externalities:
p = a − bQ + v(Q
e). (1)
where p is the price of the product, a and b are parameters and Q is aggregate output. We
assume v  <bfor the inverse demand curve to be downward sloping. The remainder of the
2model follows d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). There are two ﬁrms, each sells the good
at price p, and have access to the same technology. Each ﬁrm i performs xi units of R&D to
lower its unit cost of production. R&D yields positive technical externalities for the other
ﬁrm by reducing its unit cost of production. Firm i’s unit cost of production is given by:
ci ≡ c(xi,x j)=A − xi − βxj, (2)
where i,j e q u a lt o1o r2 ,i  = j, A is a positive parameter, and β ∈ [0,1] captures technical
spillovers. The cost for ﬁrm i to do xi units of R&D is γx2
i/2, where γ is a positive parameter.
Using (1) and (2), ﬁrm i sg r o s sp r o ﬁ t sb e f o r eR & Dc o s t si sg i v e nb y :
π(qi,q j;Q
e)=( a + v(Q
e) − b(qi + qj) − ci)qi. (3)
for i,j =1 ,2,i = j. Each ﬁrm i chooses qi which maximizes (3), taking Qe and qj as given.
Thus:
3bqi = a + v(Q
e) − 2ci + cj, (4)
for i,j =1 ,2a n di  = j. Next, we use (2) to substitute for ci and cj in (4), solve for qi as
a function of R&D which we substitute in (3), and take into account R&D costs to obtain





[˜ a + v(Q







for i,j =1 ,2,i = j, and where ˜ a = a − A.1
Firm i chooses its R&D investment which maximizes (5) while taking the other ﬁrm’s
decision as given. Focusing on symmetric R&D, i.e. x1 = x2 = x, we obtain:
x =[ ˜ a + v(Q
e)]/r, (6)
where r =[ 4 .5bγ − (1 + β)(2 − β)]/(2−β). Aggregate supply is implicitly obtained by sum-
ming (4) over i, substituting ci by the right hand side of (2) and imposing symmetry:
3bQ − 2v(Q
e)=2 ˜ a +2 ( 1+β)x. (7)
If there are no network externalities (v(Qe) = 0) then (7) yields a closed form solution
for aggregate output as a function of a ﬁrm’s R&D investment. When there are network
externalities, and depending on the v function, such a closed form solution may not exist.
1The same parameter restrictions as for the non cooperative case in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
apply here: (i) 0 <A<a ,(ii) A ≥ xi + βxj, for i,j =1 ,2,i = j, and (iii) 9bγ > 2(2 − β)2.
33 Equilibrium Analysis
We now deﬁne and derive the conditions under which an equilibrium exists.
Deﬁnition 1 A symmetric fulﬁlled expectations Nash equilibrium is such that Qe = Q, and
x1 = x2 = x, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by taking its rival’s decisions as given and
follows the speciﬁed timing of events.
An equilibrium as in deﬁnition 1 veriﬁes simultaneously (6) and (7). From (7) evaluated
at Qe = Q, using the implicit function theorem, and when the demand curve is downward
sloping, there exists a unique diﬀerentiable function h such that Q = h(x).2 Evaluate (6) at
Qe = Q = h(x)g i v e s :
v[h(x)] − rx+˜ a =0 ( 8 )
We allow network externalities to be positive over part of the domain of v[·] and derive the
conditions for the existence of an equilibrium. We then investigate the possibility of multiple
equilibria. To ﬁnd the solution(s) to (8), we deﬁne a function F :[ 0 ,A/(1 + β)] −→   such
that:
F(x)=v[h(x)] − rx+˜ a. (9)
The lower bound of the domain of F follows from non-negative R&D and the upper bound
derives from non-negative unit cost of production. We next study the roots of (9).











− ˜ a. (10)
Condition (10) states that the network externalities must not exceed a maximum level for
an interior equilibrium to exist. Otherwise, the marginal beneﬁts from an additional unit
of R&D would always exceed the marginal costs. An appropriate choice of parameters
guarantees that (10) holds.
Note that (10) is a suﬃcient condition for an equilibrium to exist. An equilibrium,
however, may exist even when (10) is violated. Consider for example a convex network
externality function which violates (10) but where there exists a level of R&D x   such that
v[h(x  )] < (rx  −˜ a). In this case an equilibrium exists. Moreover, if in equilibrium one could
2For the implicit theorem to hold 3b>2v, which is met for a downward sloping demand curve (v <b ).
4explicitly solve for Q as a function of x from (7), then (10) would be an explicit function.
For example if as in Kristiansen and Thum (1997) v(Q)=φQ, with φ ∈  +, (10) becomes:
φ<
3b(rA+˜ a(1 + β))
2a(1 + β)+3 ( rA+˜ a(1 + β))
(11)
which is an explicit condition on the slope of the network externalities function. In other
words the marginal beneﬁts from an increase in market size must not be too high for an
equilibrium to exist.
Proposition. 2 (Uniqueness) If (10) holds and v is a concave function, the fulﬁlled sym-
metric expectations equilibrium is unique.
Corollary. 1 (No network externalities) When network externalities never arise, v[·]=
0 for all x, (8) has a unique solution and is that obtained by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988):
x
dj =˜ a/r. (12)
Proposition. 3 (R&D investment) If the network-externalities function is not decreas-
ing then:
i A ﬁrm never invests less in R&D than when there are no network externalities.
ii If there exists a level of R&D ˜ x which is less than xdj and such that v[h(˜ x)] > 0, aﬁ r m
always invests more in the presence of network externalities than otherwise.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can be understood with the help of Figure 1 which
gives the solution(s) to (8) as the intersection(s) between the potentially non-linear function
v[h(x)] and the straight line (rx−˜ a). The network-externalities function in Figure 1 is such
that a consumer derives beneﬁts from the network size only above a minimum number of
consumers. That is, v[h(x)] = 0 for all x ≤ x, while for x>x , a consumer’s utility increases
in the number of consumers but at a decreasing rate. Figure 1 provides an example where
these two functions intersect more than once such that there are multiple R&D equilibria.
In Figure 1, at the xdj equilibrium the number of users has no eﬀect on a consumer’s
utility. Thus, although the product may exhibit network externalities, R&D investment is
insuﬃcient for the unit cost of production to be low enough to attract enough consumers.
Firms, anticipating a small market, do not deem it proﬁtable to invest more in R&D. Hence,
in this example there are three R&D equilibria, xdj <x   <x †. One equilibrium, x , is unstable
while the other two are stable, and the lowest R&D equilibrium coincides with what would
have been obtained if we had assumed no network externalities. Hence, ﬁrms may be trapped
at xdj although x† may Pareto dominate the other equilibria.
5Note that in Figure 1 an exogenous increase of the demand for the product, i.e. an
increase in a, shifts the (rx − ˜ a) line to the right. Consequently, if that exogenous increase
is suﬃciently high, we may achieve a new unique equilibrium to the right of x† with network
externalities. However, such an equilibrium may not be obtained if (i) the exogenous increase
is small or (ii) the network externalities function is not concave.
We now investigate which equilibrium is the most proﬁtable by determining a condition
under which a ﬁrm’s (symmetric) equilibrium proﬁts are increasing in R&D.
Proposition. 4 Assume non-negative network externalities, v  ≥ 0 for all x, and
4.5bγ < (1 + β)
2. (13)
then the highest optimal R&D is the most proﬁtable one.
Note that (13) violates the second order condition for the concavity of the joint proﬁts
function in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).3 However, our framework could still be used
to investigate the impact of R&D joint ventures on ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the presence of network
externalities. The suﬃcient condition (13) would have to be relaxed and we would have
to resort to numerical solutions to rank the diﬀerent equilibrium R&D. We do not pursue
this avenue here because (i) this note does not tackle R&D joint ventures, and (ii) it would
require that we use a speciﬁc network externalities function.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of network externalities on simultaneous investment in
cost-reducing R&D. We augment d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) R&D framework by
Katz and Shapiro (1985) analysis to account for network externalities in consumer utility.
First we show that ﬁrms invest at least as much in R&D than in the absence of network
externalities. Second, when network externalities are non linear, multiple R&D equilibria
are possible, and ﬁrms may be trapped in a low-R&D equilibrium although a higher-R&D
equilibrium may be more proﬁtable.
3See footnote 7 in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Note also that the second order condition for a
ﬁrm’s proﬁts function to be concave, (2 − β) < 4.5bγ, and (13) imply that β>0.5.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 As F(0) = ˜ a, which is positive by assumption, a suﬃcient





be negative, hence (10).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 If (10) holds and v is strictly concave, (9) has one root,
hence (8) has a unique ﬁxed-point.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 The proof is in two parts. Let ˆ x denote an equilibrium
R&D and assume that ˆ x<x dj.
i. By (8), if ˆ x<x dj,v [h(ˆ x)] + ˜ a<˜ a,⇒ v[h(ˆ x)] < 0, hence a contradiction.
7ii. By (8), r(ˆ x − xdj)=v[h(ˆ x)], which is non-negative by [i]. Hence, ˆ x ≥ xdj.










Diﬀerentiating (14) with respect to x, ∂¯ π




[4.5bγ − (1 + β)2]x − ˜ a(1 + β) − (1 + β)v[h(x)]
˜ a +( 1+β)x + v[h(x)]
(15)
for all x. As h (x)=
1+β
3b−2v is positive given that the demand curve is assumed to be downward
sloping, then assume v  ≥ 0 for all x, and use (15) to obtain (13).
A.5 Figure














The equilibrium R&D investments are: xdj,x   and x†; xdj is d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) solution; x is a threshold level of R&D below which the network
externalities function equals 0.
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